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Colorado River Authority case leaves the meaning of Article XI, Section 9, uncertain. Thus, while the court has succeeded in clarifying the
definition of the "public property for public use" clause of Article
VIII, Section 2, the interpretation of the "public property" clause in
Article XI, Section 9, is more clouded than ever.
Charles T. Locke
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Fracasse v.

Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972).
Appellant was a licensed attorney retained under a contingent fee
contract by appellee to prosecute a claim for personal injuries. Under
the employment contract appellee agreed to compensate the appellant
at 3 3 1/ per cent, if any settlement was made 30 days before the trial
date, and at 40 per cent if any recovery was obtained thereafter. Shortly
afterwards, before any recovery had been obtained in the suit, appellee
discharged the appellant and retained another attorney. Appellant thereupon sought declaratory relief, alleging that his discharge was without
cause and that the employment contract was breached by the appellee,
asking that the court determine his interest in the contract and that he
be allowed to recover such upon the occurrence of the contingency and
recovery by the appellee. Appellee specially and generally demurred and
the trial court sustained the general demurrer holding that the complaint did not state a cause of action. Held-Affirmed. An attorney discharged with or without cause is limited to a quantum meruit recovery
for the reasonable value of his services rendered to the time of discharge.
Moreover, the right of recovery under the contingent fee contract does
not accrue until the occurrence of the stated contingency.'
It has been the rule that an attorney discharged without cause is
entitled, under a noncontingent fee employment contract, to the reasonable value of his services rendered to the time of discharge. 2 Some
jurisdictions do not confine this recovery to quantum meruit but allow
recovery of damages on the breach of contract,3 while others allow re1 Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 10 (Cal. 1972).
2 Kirk v. Culley, 261 P. 994 (Cal. 1927); In re Montgomery, 6 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1936);
see Oliver v. Campbell, 273 P.2d 15 (Cal. 1954); cf. Young v. Tian, 150 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ dism'd) (noncontingent contract where both attorney and
client assented to abandonment; recovery by the attorney was on quantum meruit).
3 Kikuchi v. Ritchie, 202 F. 857 (9th Cir. 1913); Philbrook v. Novy, 77 N.E. 520 (Mass.
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covery for the full contract price, 4 based on the theory that the contract
is the only measure of damages. Where the attorney is not retained
under a contract of employment setting out his fees and is discharged
without cause, he is allowed to recover the reasonable value of his
services.5 However, in situations where the attorney is discharged for
cause on a noncontingent fee contract, there is no recovery on quantum7
meruit or on the contract, 6 although there are cases to the contrary.
The result would appear to be the same in cases involving contingent
fee contracts.8
In situations involving the discharge without cause of an attorney on
a contingent fee contract, the laws vary. Where the client's action constitutes a breach of contract and where the client has obtained a settlement or judgment, some jurisdictions have measured and ascertained
the recovery as the full contract price.9 Other jurisdictions have allowed
a remedy under quantum meruit'0 or damages for the breach of contract." However, where the client has breached the contract and the
contingency has not occurred, either to the benefit or detriment of the
client, courts have barred recovery both on the contract price 1 2 and on
13
Moreover, damages for
the reasonable value of the attorney's services.
4
denied.'
been
breach of contract have also
The California ,courts early recognized the right of the client to discharge his attorney 5 and subsequently gave such right statutory authority.' 6 In Gage v. A twater,1 an action brought by an attorney challenging
his removal, the court held:
1906); Grant v. Langley, 68 N.Y.S. 820 (Sup. Ct. 1901). Contra, In re Montgomery, 6
N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1936).
4 Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 9 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1942); Myers v. Crockett, 14 Tex. 257 (1855).
5 Elconin v. Yalin, 282 P. 791 (Cal. 1929) (dictum); Gamwell v. Killion, 282 S.W. 873
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1926, no writ).
6 Fletcher v. Kellog, 6 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 555, 46 S. Ct. 18, 70
L. Ed. 409 (1925); Warner v. Basten, 255 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. Ct. App. 1970); Holmes v. Evans,
29 N.E. 233 (N.Y. 1891).
7 Phelps v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 217 N.E.2d 519 (Ill. Ct. App. 1966); cf. Price v. Western
Loan & Say. Co., 100 P. 677 (Utah 1909).
8 Moore v. Fellner, 325 P.2d 857 (Cal. 1958); Salopek v. Schoemann, 124 P.2d 21 (Cal.
1942).
9 Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Sup. 1969); Randolph, Bowen & Co.
v. Randolph, 34 Tex. 181 (1870) (noncontingent fee contract).
10 Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916); Thompson v. Smith, 248 S.W. 1070 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1923, jdgmt adopted).
11 White v. Burch, 19 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1929, writ ref'd). Contra,
Cole v. Myers, 21 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1941); Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916).
12 Bartlett v. Odd-Fellows' Say. Bank, 21 P. 743, 744 (Cal. 1889); accord, Friedman v.
Mindlin, 155 N.Y.S. 295 (N.Y. City Ct. 1915). Contra, Tillman v. Komar, 181 N.E. 75, 76
(N.Y. 1932).
13 Webb v. Trescony, 18 P. 796 (Cal. 1888) (noncontingent fee contract). Contra, Tracy
v. MacIntyre, 84 P.2d 526 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938); Tillman v. Komar, 181 N.E. 75 (N.Y.
1932).
'4 Fivey v. Chambers, 19 Cal. Rptr. 111 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); see McConnell v. Corona
City Water Co., 85 P. 929 (Cal. 1906).
15 People v. Norton, 16 Cal. 436 (1860).
16 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. § 284 (Deering 1959):
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[T]he rule must be considered as settled in this state-the client
has the absolute right to change his attorney at any stage in the
action. .

.

. [The] client is justified in seeking to dissolve that

relation whenever he ceases to have absolute confidence in either
the integrity or the judgment or the capacity of the attorney.' 8
This right was qualified, however, where the attorney employed had an
interest in the litigation, 19 in which case the client had the right or
power to discharge the attorney but not the right to discharge liability
under the contract.
The early case of Baldwin v. Bennett20 established California law as
to damages under a noncontingent fee contract when the attorney was
discharged without cause. Holding that quantum meruit would be
proper 2 1 the court recognized an exception.
Where from the nature of the contract, (as in this case) no possible
mode is left of ascertaining the damage, we will have presented
the anomalous case of a wrong without a remedy, unless we adopt
the only measure of damages which remains, and that is, the price
agreed to be paid.22
The court thus set out damages recoverable on breached noncontingent
contracts.2 3 The basis for damages recoverable under such contracts is
adequately set out in the later case of McConnell v. Corona City Water
Co. 2 4 The holding in Baldwin was never to be seriously challenged in
The attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before
or after judgment or final determination, as follows:
1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon
minutes;
2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney,
after notice from one to the other except that in all civil cases in which the fee
or compensation of the attorney is contingent upon the recovery of money, in which
case the court shall determine the amount and terms of payment of the fee or
compensation to be paid by the party. (Emphasis added.)
The 1937 decision of Cassel v. Gregori, 70 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1937) held that this latter provision which had been added in 1935 was void as an infringement of the constitutional
right to trial by jury and a discriminatory classification of cases. The provision was later
removed by the legislature. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. § 284 (Deering Supp. 1971), amending
CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. § 284 (Deering 1959).
'7 68 P. 581 (Cal. 1902); see Salopek v. Schoemann, 124 P.2d 21 (Cal. 1942); Echlin v.
Superior Court, 90 P.2d 63 (Cal. 1939).
18 68 P. 581, 582 (Cal. 1902).
19 Kirk v. Culley, 261 P. 994 (Cal. 1927); Todd v. Superior Court, 184 P. 684 (Cal. 1919);
Fivey v. Chambers, 19 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); cf. Gage v. Atwater, 68 P. 581
(Cal. 1902).
204 Cal. 392 (1854).
21 Id. at 393.
22 Id. at 393.
23 Oliver v. Campbell, 273 P.2d 15 (Cal. 1954); Webb v. Trescony, 18 P. 796 (Cal. 1888);
Countryman v. California Trona Co., 170 P. 1069 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1918).
24 85 P. 929, 930 (Cal. 1906):
One who has been injured by a breach of contract has an election to pursue any of
three remedies. He may treat the contract as rescinded and may recover upon a
quantum meruit so far as he has performed; or he may keep the contract alive, for

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 4 [2022], No. 2, Art. 13

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

subsequent decisions and, although evoking minor dissent, was to remain the law of California.
Recovery of the full contract price would be allowed on a contingent
fee contract where, the attorney had been discharged without cause. 25
The court in Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co. v.
Kinsler26 upheld this and awarded the attorney the full contract price.
However, the circumstances in Zurich showed the inequity of this procedure and prompted the court in Salopek v. Schoemann27 to reconsider
this remedy 28 and allow only quantum meruit recovery by an attorney
discharged without cause. 29
A difficulty encountered by the injured party in recovering for breach
of contract lay in bringing the action at the proper time. The courts
had already determined that there could be no action for recovery until
the contingency had occurred.3 0 Moreover, although declaratory relief
had been available since 1921,31 no case involving attorney fees had ever
utilized the procedure to determine damages before the occurrence of
the contingency.
The court in Fracassev. Brent 2 declined to follow all precedent in the
measurement of damages. Feeling that "policy dictated a review of the
law," the court attacked the premise behind Baldwin in awarding damages for the contract price as being "faulty," there being "no convincing
the benefit of both parties, being at all times ready and able to perform; or, third,
he may treat the repudiation as putting an end to the contract for all purposes of
performance, and sue for the profits he would have realized if he had not been prevented from performing.
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcTS § 326 (1938).
25 Bartlett v. Odd-Fellows' Say. Bank, 21 P. 743 (Cal. 1889).
2681 P.2d 913 (Cal. 1938).
27 124 P.2d 21 (Cal. 1942) (an action brought by an assignee to recover for services
performed by assignor attorney under a contingent fee contract in which discharge was
with cause).
28 Id. at 24 (Gibson, C.J., and Traynor, J., concurring):
The compensation of an attorney employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged without cause should be measured by the reasonable value of the services
performed, not by the fee fixed in the contract. The cases in this state allowing recovery of the full contract fee under such circumstances should be overruled.
The case of Denio v. City of Huntington Beach, 140 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1943) found Gibson,
C.J., and Traynor, J., again urging the same proposition in a dissent of a case involving
the submission of damages in an employment contract as being the compensation fixed by
the contract; the dissent saw no reason for not submitting an issue calling for a quantum
meruit recovery on a contingent fee contract.
29 The court in Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kinsler, 75 P.2d 115 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App.), revd, 81 P.2d 913 (Cal. 1938) had awarded the appellant in the case the reasonable
value of his services, ascertained at $75, refusing to allow recovery on the contract for onethird of the $2000 judgment; the lower court, however, had found the attorney discharged
with cause. No doubt the disparity of the figures weighed in the dissent in Denio.
30 Bartlett v. Odd-Fellows' Sav. Bank, 21 P. 743 (Cal. 1889); Brown v. Connolly, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 158 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); see Moore v. Fellner, 325 P.2d 857 (Cal. 1958); Jones v.
Martin, 256 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1953). Contra, Tracy v. MacIntyre, 84 P.2d 526 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1938). The lower court found it "unreasonable to rest an attorney's compensation
upon the outcome of a trial which may never occur." Id. at 528.
31 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. §§ 1060, 1062a (Deering 1959).
32 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972).
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reason why recovery on a quantum meruit theory would not fairly and
adequately compensate the attorney for his services." 33 The court, noting
that Baldwin had been controlling in all subsequent contractual fee
cases, overuled it and its progeny, stating that recovery on all breached
attorneys' fees contracts thereafter was to be on quantum meruit.
Recognizing the power of a client to discharge his attorney, but with
liability attaching if the attorney had an interest and was discharged
without cause, Fracasse acknowledged that the possible penalty in discharging an attorney without cause had limited the exercise of this right.
The right to discharge is of little value if the client must risk paying
the full contract price for services not rendered upon a determina84
tion by a court that the discharge was without legal cause.
Thereupon, instead of furnishing the client with a test to determine
what was sufficient cause to discharge an attorney without liability, the
court, held as sufficient the client's loss of faith in the attorney.3 5 Using
the reasoning in Martin v. Camp 6 the court extended this finding to
hold that such discharge by a client, with or without cause, would not
constitute a breach of the employment contract and that the client
could terminate the contract at will.
The court, in response to an amicus brief, could see no difficulty in
ascertaining quantum meruit recoveries where it had done so previously
when an attorney had been discharged with cause;3 7 nor could it see
difficulty in allowing clients to rescind and abandon their employment
contracts at will.
To the extent that such discharge is followed by the retention of
another attorney, the client will in any event be required, out of
any recovery, to pay the former attorney for the reasonable value
of his services. Such payment, in addition to the fee charged by the
second attorney, should certainly operate3 8as a self-limiting factor
on the number of attorneys so discharged.
The appellant having sought declaratory relief on the contract before
occurrence of the contingency, the court turned to the question of timeliness in bringing the action. Noting that earlier decisions had held
that a claim based upon unlawful discharge of an attorney retained
33Id. at 12.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
36 114 N.E. 46, 48 (N.Y. 1916). The court stated: "The discharge of the attorney by his
client does not constitute a breach of contract, because it is a term of such contract,
implied from the peculiar relationship which the contract calls into existence, that the
client may terminate the contract at any time with or without cause."
37 Salopek v. Schoemann, 124 P.2d 21 (Cal. 1942); see TEx. CODE PROF. REsP., art. III,
§ 8, DR2-106 (1971).
38 Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 13 (Cal. 1972).
34
35
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under a contingent fee contract did not accrue until the occurrence of
the contingency, the court now declined to modify this rule in accordance with the new remedy set forth by the court. Holding that an
attorney's action for quantum meruit would accrue only with the occurrence of the contingency as stated in the contract, the court felt that,
as in Brown v. Connolly,"0 determination should wait on the result.
Moreover, the impropriety of burdening the client with an absolute
obligation to pay the former attorney regardless of the outcome of
the litigation would discourage poorer clients from employing the more
financially realistic contingent fee arrangement. 40 The court refused to
approve Tracy v. Maclntyre4' which had allowed an attorney discharged
without cause on a contingent fee contract to sue immediately for recovery on quantum meruit without awaiting occurrence of the contingency. Declaratory relief was denied the appellant, the court finding no
present controversy or circumstances justifying such; the court thus declined to follow Martin to its conclusion that the cause of action
accrues at the time of discharge where the contract is terminated, and
not until the occurrence of the contingency in the contingent fee contract. 42 Notwithstanding this, the court found that since an attorney

agrees initially to take his chances on recovering any fee whatever in a
recovery should be denied
contingent fee arrangement, quantum meruit
43
an attorney where there is no recovery.
A strong and vigorous dissent was filed in Fracasse,urging retention
of Baldwin as authority for the proper remedy for breach of the employment contract by the client. 44 In a well reasoned opinion, the

dissent also recommended that declaratory relief be made available to
the injured party in contingent fee contracts prior to the occurrence
of the contingency, where the remedy was now to be on quantum
meruit.

45

In examining Fracasseit would be well to note that although the action was brought on a contingent fee contract, the implication of the
holding extends to noncontingent fee contracts. Moreover, although the
court has established quantum meruit as the proper measure of damages,
the court is contradictory where it forbids quantum meruit to be mea89 83 Cal. Rptr. 158, 160 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969): The court had felt that to allow recovery
on the contract before occurrence of the contingency would lead to unfair consequences to
the client since "[e]xperience has shown that more often than not the size of a party's claim
bears little relation to its value."
40 Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972). But there is a rather critical observation
by Sullivan, C.J.: "If the majority assert, contingent fee contracts frequently involve
clients of limited means, prompt establishment of an interest in a portion of the proceeds
may therefore be essential to recovery." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 17 (dissenting opinion).
41 84 P.2d 526 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
42 Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46, 49 (N.Y. 1916).
43 Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972).
44 Id. at 18.
45 Id. at 22.
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